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[L. A. No. 18674. In Bank. May 2, 1944.)

EDNA E. ROSS et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF LONG
BEACH, Appellant.
[la-1c] Taxation - Exemptions - Property Used for School Purposes.-Under Canst., art. XIII, § 1, exempting from taxation
(1) property used exclusively for certain purposes, including
public school purposes, and (2) property belonging to the
United States and other governmental bodies, property rented
or leased to a school district and used by the district exclusively for public school purposes is exempt from taxation, notwithstanding the fact that such property is owned by a private'
individual and not by the district, as it is the use and not the,
own~rship of the property in the possession of a school dis.
trict that determines its status as property exempt from taxation.
[2] Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitution-Language

of Enactment.-Courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is declared in the Constitution in definite language, than they are to disregard existing express provisions
of the Constitution.
[3] Id.-Exemptions-Property Used for School Purposes.-The

exemption from taxation of property used for public school
purposes is not for the benefit of the private ",wner who may
rent his property for said purpose, but for the advantage of
the school district that may be compelled to rent property
rather than to buy land and erect buildings thereon to be used
for the maintenance of a school.
[4] Landlord and Tenant-Rent-Implied Contract for Rent.In the ordinary course of business the occupancy of premises"
by one person with the consent of the owner creates the relation of landlord and tenant, and in the absence of an understanding to the contrary, implies an agreement on the tenant's
part to pay a reasonable rent for such occupation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed.
[lJ See 24 CaI.Jur. 105; 26 R.C.L. 320.
[2J See 5 CaI.Jur. 599; 11 Am.Jur. 678.
[4J See 15 CaI.Jur. 713; 32 Am.Jur. 349.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3J Taxation, § 78; [2J Constitutional
Law, § 29i (4] Landlord and Tenant, § 141.

Action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment for
plaintiffs after overruling general demurrer to complaint, af·
firmed.
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney, and Joseph B. Lamb and
Frank C. Charvat, Deputies City Attorney, for Appellant.
J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel, and Q()rdon Boller, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of; Appellant.
W. Ward Johnson and Frederic A. Shaffer for Respondent.
CURTIS, J.-This- is an appeal from a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs after the overruling of a general demurrer
to plaintiffs' complaint. The defendant was given time in
which to answer the complaint, but failed to do so with the
result that judgment was entered against it on January 15,
1943, and the appeal now before us is from said judgment.
The action was brought to recover taxes alleged to have
been illegally levied upon real property belonging to plaintiffs and paid by them under protest. The property involved
is certain property situated in the city of Long Beach and the
improvements thereon.
It is alleged in the complaint "that there is now, and at
all times herein mentioned has been, located upon said real
property a building, and the entire premises, both said re~l
property and building, are now and at all times herein mentioned, and ever since February 28, 194~ have been exclu~
sively possessed and occupied by Long Beach City High
,School District of Los Angeles County, California, and duro
ing all such times said premises have been used exclusively
as and for a public schooL"
[1a] It is plaintiffs' contention that said property is ex·
empt from taxation under the provisions of section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution of this state. Said section of
the Constitution in part provides that "All property in the
State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not
exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed
'. ' .. The word 'property,' as used in this article and section,
is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks,
dues, franchises, and all other matters and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of private ownership; ... provided,
that property used for free public libraries and free museums,
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growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools.
a.nd such as may belong to the United States, this State, or
to any county, city and county, or municipal corporation
within this State shall be exempt from taxation." (Italics
ours.)
It will be noted that under this section of the Constitution,
property which is exempt from taxation is divided into two
separate and distinct classes, that is, "property used exclusively" for certain purposes including "public school purposes," and property" as may belong to the United States,"
.and other governmental bodies. The contention is made and
supported by some authorities that if property is in private
ownership but rellted to a school district, and the district
occupies it and is in physical possession of the whole of said
property and nses it for school purposes and for no other
purpose, still said property is not exempt under said constitutional provision for the reason that it is owned by a private individual, and by the owner rented or leased to the
school district. To so construe the constitutional provision
would tend to eliminate the main distinction between the two
classes of property enumerated therein. In order to so construe this provision of the Constitution it would be necessary
to insert therein the words "which may belong to a school
district" or words of similar import, so that the clause respecting property used for pUblic school purposes would read
"'property which may belong to a school district and used
exclusively for public school purposes." To insert these suggested words into this section of the Constitution would give
to it an added meaning not to be found in the definite language of the section as adopted by the people. [2] "Courts
are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is declared
[in the Constitution] in definite language, than they are to
disregard existing express provisions [of the Constitution]."
(5 Cal.Jur. 599; People v. Oampbell, 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P.
918].)
[Ib]. As we read the section of the Constitution above
quoted in part, we find nothing therein which is either uncertain or' ambiguous or calls for construction or interpretation. It clearly provides that property which belongs to the
United States, the state, county, city and county or municipal corporation in the state, is exempt from taxation, and it
just as clearly provides that property used exclusively for
certain purposes including public schools, is also exempt from
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taxation. This section of the Constitution was before this
court in the case of Anderson-Oottonwood I. Dist. v. Kluk-.
kert, 13 Ca1.2d 191, 192 [88 P.2d 685]. In that case this.
court stated the problem in the following language: "Basically, the merits of the cause are determinable from 'a consideration of the pertinent provisions that are contained \
within section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution of this
state. Therein, it is provided that ' ... property used for free
public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property
used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to
the United States, this state, or to any county, city and
county, or municipal corporation within this state shall be
exempt from taxation, ... ' (Italics added.)" It was there
contended that this provision of the' Constitution in certain
respects was' ambiguous and should be 'construed by the. court.
In considering this contention the court following the decision in San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 491[152 P.
980] held: (p. 196) "We find ourselves unable to discover,
from the language employed in the coristitution [art. XIII,
sec. 1], any reason for interpretation, or ground for entertaining doubt as to its meaning. The language employed in
classifying the property declared to be exempt :from taxation,
it will be. noted, limits the exemption as to property used for
free public libraries and free museums and property used
for public schools, but the language following is-' and such
(property) as may belong to the United States, this state, or
to any county or municipal corporation within this state shall
be exempt from taxation.' "
"Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether ii be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature (orframers of a constitution) should be intended to me~ what they
have plainly.expressed, and consequently,no room is left for
construction. Possible or even probable meanings; when one
is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are .not.
at liberty to search for elsewhere." (San Francisco v. Mc~:
Govern, .28 Cal.App. 491, 499 [152 P. 980], quoting from
State v. McGough, 118 Ala. 159 [24 So.395].)·
It· is further suggested that the intent of the framers "of
the Constitution, and of' the people in adopting. it, to exempt from taxation property in private ownerShip and leased.
t() a school district and used by the district exclusively for,
public
schools, is emphasized by
reason, of subsequent. ....ena~t~
.
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ments of said section of the Constitution without amendment,
while similar constitutional exemptions were subsequently
made respecting other and different classes of property and
by such subsequent enactments it was expressly provided that
no property so used which may be rented and the rent received by the owner therefor shall be exempt from taxation.
Section 1 of article XIII was in the original Constitution
adopted in 1879. This section was readopted with certain
amendments in 1894, 1910, and 1914, but the provision exempting property used exclusively for public schools from
taxation was retained without any change whatever. Subsequently section Vh of article XIII, exempting church property from taxation, was adopted in 1900, and section llha,
exempting orphanages, was adopted in 1920. Each of these
subsequently adopted sections expressly provides that no
property "so used" which may be rented and the rent received by the owner therefor shall be exempt from taxation.
We may well infer from a consideration of these three sections of the Constitution, each providing for the exemption
of a certain class of property, as two of them contain an express exception of property where rented and the owner
thereof receives the rent, and the other of the three sections
contains no such exception, that a different rule is to be applied in one case from that which would control in the other.
In other words, by section 1 of article XIII property used
exclusively for public school purposes is declared exempt from
taxation, while under sections llh and llha church property
and property used as an orphanage are declared exempt from
taxation only when not rented from a private owner who receives rent for the use of his property.
Evidently the framers of the Constitution in making the
exception in favor of property used exclusively for public
school purposes had in mind the great benefits derived from
our educational institutions and desired to relieve them from
the burden of taxation. The history of this state shows that
it has been the steadfast policy of the people of the state to
encourage in every possible way the cause of education.
[3] The exemption of property used for public school purposes is not for the benefit of the private owner who may rent
his property for said purpose, but for the advantage of the
school district that may be compelled to rent property rather
than to buy land and erect buildings thereon to be used for
the maintenance of its school. With this advantage the school
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district is able to rent property for a lower rental than the
owner of the same property would be willing to accept from
a private individual, for the reason that if rented to a school
district the owner is relieved from the payment of taxes
thereon. On the other hand, if there is no exemption from
taxation of property in private ownership but rented to a
school .district and by it used exclusively for public school
purposes, then a school district, when finding it necessary to
rent property to be used in the work of maintaining its school,
must compete with private persons and pay the same or higher
rental than private persons would pay in order to secure
property of the same kind and character.
We conclude therefore that the property involved herein
is property used exclusively for public school purposes and
is thus exempt from taxation. In the consideration of the
question now before us, we are assuming that the real property of the plaintiffs has been rented or leased by them to the
school district for a monetary consideration, and that the
school district is not usin" the same free of rent. The complaint is silent on this question, and we are controlled entirely by the facts alleged therein. Of course, the plaintiffs
would be in a much more advantageous position were they
permitting the school district to use their property without
the payment of rent. W ere that the situation between the
parties, we would expect that fact to be set forth in the complaint. Not being alleged, we assume that it does not exist.
[4] Furthermore, in the ordinary course of business the occupancy of premises by one person with the consent of the
owner creates the relation of landlord and tenant, and in the
absence of an understanding to the contrary, implies an agreement on the part of the tenant to pay a reasonable rent for
such occupation. (32 Am.Jur. p. 349.) It is presumed that
in business transactions between individuals the ordinary
course of business has been followed. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1963, subd. 20.) Weare making this situation clear, as we
desire it to be definitely understood that our opinion in this
case is not based on any assumption or on any uncertain supposition that the school district is in the possession and is
enjoying the use of the property free of rent.
[1c] Appellant and amici curiae take the position, relying principally upon certain decisions of other jurisdictions,
that the property in question is not exempt from taXation

Iii
t.l.·

['

264

Ross

V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

(24 C.2d

for the reason that" as they construe said constitutional section, it is not "used exclusively for public school purposes."
They concede that the school district is in the exclusive physical possession of the entire property and is actually usi~g
the whole thereof for public school purposes. However, they
take the position that such possession and such use of the
property' by the school district does not bring it within the
terms of the Constitution declaring that property "used exclusively for public school purposes" is exempt from taxation. They contend that there is a further and additional
use of said property than that for which the school district
uses it, and that is the use by the private owner who rents it
for the purpose of deriving revenue therefrom. In this contention they cite and claim that they are supported by the
decisions of a number of courts of other jUdisdictions. (Travelers' Ins. 00. v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349 [50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E.
723] ; People v. Oity of Ohicago, 323 Ill. 68 [153 N.E. 725] ;
Turnvere'in (( Lincoln" v. Board of Appeals, 358 Ill. 135 [192
N.E. 780] ; State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 187 Mo. 238
[86 S.W. 138, 2 Ann.Cas. 808] ; South Dakota Sigma Ohapter House Assn. v. Clay Oounty, 65 S.D. 559 [276 N.W. 258] ;
Norwegian Lutheran Ohurch v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581 [30
P.2d 381].)
The cases from the Supreme Courts of South Dakota and
Washington and Turnverein (( Lincoln" v. Bd. of Appeals from
the Supreme Court of Illinois are easily distinguishable from
the present case. The cases from the Supreme Courts of Missouri and Indiana and People v. Oity of Ohicago from the Supreme Court of Illinois may be said to support the position of
the appellant and amici curiae. As against these authorities
the respondents cite the following cases which appear to be in
point and sustain their position. (State v. Alabama Educational Foundation, 231 Ala. 11 [163 So. 527] and two prior
decisions from the same state; Washburn Oollege v. Oounty
of Shawnee, 8 Kan. 344; Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, 59 Neb. 571 [81 N.W. 624] ; Gerke v. Purcell,25 Ohio
St. 229.)
The opinion in the case of Washburn Oollege v. Oounty of
Shawnee, supra, was written by Mr. Justice Brewer, who
later became a member of the United States Supreme Court.
We find the following paragraph from the opinjon, which
we quote: (8 Kan. 349) " To bring this property within the
terms of the section quoted it must be 'used exclusively for
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literary and educational purposes.' This involves three things,
first, that the property is used; second, that it is used for
educational purposes; and third, that it is used for no other
purpose. . . . Nor is ownership evidence of use. . . This is too
plain to need either argument or illustration. If the framers
of the constitution had intended to exempt all property belonging to literary and charitable institutions from taxation,
the language employed would have been very different. They'
would have used the simple, ordinary language for expressing such intention. The fact that they ignored 'ownership,'
and made 'use' the test of exemption, shows clearly that they
recognized the essential distinction between the two, and established the latter rather than the former as the basis of
exem ption. "
In Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, supra, it is concisely stated: (59 Neb. 573) "To hold that a religious society must be the absolute owner of the property occupied
or used by it exclusively for church purposes to create the
exemption would be to inject words into the constitution and
statute which are not therein written. This we have no power
to do."
It thus appears that the authorities from other jurisdictions are in conflict. To hold, however, with the appellant
and follow the authorities cited by it and amici curiae, it
would be necessary for us to construe the consitutional section of our state as requiring property used by a school district for public school purposes not only to be solely used by
the district but also to be owned by the district before it
would be exempt from taxation. As previously stated in this
opinion, we are not able to so construe the applicable section
of our Constitution. On the other hand, we are in accord
with the decisions of thosfl 00urts in other jurisdictions, as
well as in our own, which hold that it is the use and not the
ownership of the property in the possession of a school district and used by it for public school purposes that determines its status as property exempt from taxation.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is the established rule in this
state that no property shall be exempt from taxation unless
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the Constitution clearly makes it exempt. Tax exemption provisions are therefore strictly construed. (Cypress Lawn Cemetery Association v. San Francisco, 211 Cal. 387, 390 [295 P.
813J ; San Francisco v. Pacific Telephone &; Telegraph Co., 166
Cal. 244 [135 P. 971J ; Bay Cities Transportation Co. v. John-,
son, 8 Cal.2d 706 [68 P.2d 710J.) It is to be noted t4at section 1 of article Xln of the California Constitution does not
exempt all property owned by a public school district, as it
does property owned by the United States, the state, counties,
and municipal corporations. The school property exempted is
limited to that used exclusively for public schools. It is my
opinion that in so wording the section, the framers of the'
Constitution did not intend to accord greater tax exemption
privileges to school districts than to the United States, the
state, counties, and municipal corporations, and certainly did
not intend to exempt from taxation privately owned property. On the contrary, by setting apart school property from
that of the other public bodies and making its exemption dependent on its use for public schools, they intended to provide for the taxation of any property belonging to school
districts but not used exclusively for public schools.
The constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiffs exempt "property used exclusively for public schools." (Italics added.) The word "property" includes all of the interests and estates therein. There is a recognized distinction in
the several interests that may exist in property, and this
court has sanctioned their separate consideration for purposes
of taxation. (Pacific Wharf &; $torage Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 180 Cal. 31 [179 P. 398J; San Pedro etc. R. R. Co.
v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18 [179 P. 393J; Central Manufacturing Dist. Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 214 Cal.
288 [5 P.2d 424J ; Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County,
155 Cal. 140 [99 P. 483, 20 L.R.A.N.S. 211] ; Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285
P. 896]; Hammond Lttmber Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 12
Cal.App.2d 277 [55 P.2d 891].) It follows that the property
is not tax exempt unless all interests in the property, including the lessor's interest, are used exclusively for pUblic
schools. Even if the interest of the lessee school district is
used exclusively for public schools, it does not follow that the
interest of the lessor who has rented his property for private gain is so used. The lessor, like any other lessor of
commercial property, uses his interest in the property, not'
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for public schools, but for the ordinary commercial use ot
producing income. (In re South Dakota Sigma Chapter
House Assn. v. Clay County, 65 S.D. 559 [276 N.W. 258];
State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 187 Mo. 238 [86 S.W. 138,
2 Ann.Cas. 808] ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. City of
Wildwood, 118 Fla. 771 [160 So. 208] ; Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349 [50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 723] ; Spohn v.
Stark, 197 Ind. 299 [150 N.E. 787] ; Norwegian Lutheran
Church v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581 [30 P.2d 381]; Laurent
v. City of Muscatine, 59 Iowa 404 [13 N.W. 409] ; see Oarteret Academy v. State Board, 102 N.J.L. 525 [133 A. 886].)
The-remova:l -of such property from the tax rolls serves only
to increase the tax burden on other property to meet the costs
of government that would otherwise be met by taxes on the
exempted property.

[L. A. No. 18763. In Bank. May 2, 1944.J
PAUL METCALF et aI., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS
,
ANGELES, Respondent.
[1] Injunction - Other Remedies-Administrative Remedies.-A

party aggrieved by the application of a statute or ordinance
must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedies provided
thereby before he may resort to the courts for relief.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Remedies-Exhausting Extrajudicial Remedies.-An action to enjoin the
enforcement of a zoning ordinance on the ground of its unconstitutionality as applied to plaintiff's property will' not lie
prior to the exhaustion of the procedure set forth therein
whereby property mlLy be excepted from its restrictions. This
is true even though the granting or denial of the exception
rests in the discretion of a local board, and the application
for an exception is an admission of, the constitutionality of
the ordinance.
[3] Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Remedies-Effect of Denial of Exception.-The denial of an application to except property
[1] Injunction against zoning ordinances, notes, 54 A.L.R. 366;
129 A.L.R. 885. See, also, 12 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 158.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunction, § 26; [2, 3] Municipal
Corporations, § 160.

